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Abstract— Virtual property theft is a serious problem that 
exists in virtual worlds. Legitimate users of these worlds 
invest considerable amounts of time, effort and real-world 
money into obtaining virtual property, but unfortunately, 
are becoming victims of theft in high numbers. It is reported 
that there are over 1 billion registered users of virtual 
worlds containing virtual property items worth an estimated 
US$50 billion dollars. The problem of virtual property theft 
is complex, involving many legal, social and technological 
issues. The software used to access virtual worlds is of great 
importance as they form the primary interface to these 
worlds and as such the primary interface to conduct virtual 
property theft. The security vulnerabilities of virtual world 
applications have not, to date, been examined. This study 
aims to use the process of software inspection to discover 
security vulnerabilities that may exist within virtual world 
software – vulnerabilities that enable virtual property theft 
to occur. Analyzing three well know virtual world 
applications World of Warcraft, Guild Wars and Entropia 
Universe, this research utilized security analysis tools and 
scenario testing with focus on authentication, trading, 
intruder detection and virtual property recovery. It was 
discovered that all three examples were susceptible to 
keylogging, mail and direct trade methods were the most 
likely method for transferring stolen items, intrusion 
detection is of critical concern to all VWEs tested, stolen 
items were unable to be recovered in all cases and lastly 
occurrences of theft were undetectable in all cases. The 
results gained in this study present the key problem areas 
which need to be addressed to improve security and reduce 
the occurrence of virtual property theft. 
 
Index Terms— virtual worlds, virtual property theft, real 
money trading, keylogging, vulnerability, software 
inspection 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Virtual World Environments (VWEs) are computing 
simulation environments that allow users to socialize, 
play, compete and even work in an immersive on-line 
virtual world. VWEs have their heritage in the text-based 
multi-user computer games (MUDs) of the 1980s [1], 
while modern versions are commonly visually rich 3D, 
extensive environments that range from fantasy and space 
based realms, to life-like real world environments. The 
number of people actively participating in these 
environments has grown dramatically over recent years 
and current reports indicate the number of registered 
virtual world users exceed 1 billion world-wide [1]. It is 
common for users to pay a subscription fee to access 
these worlds and then, over a period of time, through 
completing various tasks are able to collect items that are 
owned by the VWE character, representing the player. It 
is also possible in many VWEs for users to spend real-
world money to purchase items as well. The investment 
made by users in terms of their time, effort and real-world 
money, places a value on these virtual property items, 
which can then be traded with or sold to other users for 
either virtual-world or real-world currency. Virtual 
worlds expert Marcus Eikenberry estimates the market 
value of virtual property as high as US$50 billion dollars 
[2].  
The ability to convert virtual property into real-world 
money has enabled the rise of a serious problem faced by 
many in VWEs, that of virtual property theft (VPT) [3]. 
The problem of VPT is complex as it envelopes many 
diverse areas, such as legal issues – lack of laws to 
support prosecution, especially in cases that span 
international borders; social issues – such as identity theft 
and harassment; and technological issues – the 
appropriate use of security methods and tools (within the 
software used to access VWEs) to protect resources.  
Users access VWEs through software running on their 
computers. Commonly, this is in the form of a client-
application that connects to a remote server application 
holding the data associated with the VWE. Although 
security in client-server based and other forms of 
distributed system applications has been researched 
extensively, to date, there has been no research on the 
security aspects of VWE software. It is this software 
(technology) that is used to access VWEs, and thus, it is 
important to understand the security vulnerabilities of 
such software. Having information on potential security 
vulnerabilities will help identify approaches needed to 
address the problem of VPT. This information can be 
used to form recommendations to VWE developers on 
how to improve their software and ultimately providing 
users with an appropriate level of trust to actively 
participate in VWEs. 
The goal of this paper is to discover what 
vulnerabilities and threats may exist in software used to 
access popular VWEs that enable the problem of virtual 
property theft (VPT). One method to discover these 
vulnerabilities would be to analyze and test the actual 
source code for the VWEs. Due to the commercial nature 
of VWEs, companies will not provide the source code for 
research by an independent party; therefore 
vulnerabilities must be identified through an external 
examination of the executable VWE software. Therefore, 
to achieve our goal an operational software inspection 
technique [4] is employed as a method to externally 
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assess the quality of software (in this case VWEs) and to 
reduce the number of defects (security vulnerabilities).  
There are many hundreds of VWEs that exist and since 
it is not feasible to analyze all, a representative selection 
of three VWEs was made. These included: World of 
Warcraft, Guild Wars and Entropia Universe were 
chosen based on their popularity among player (number 
of registered users), length of time they have been active, 
known issues with VPT, and examples of real money 
trading (RMT) of virtual property [5]. 
The inspection of the VWE software involves 
discovering functional and design problems related to 
VPT that may exist. These relate to issues including: 
authentication, virtual property trading and recovery. As 
far as can be discovered from published literature an 
inspection process of this nature has not been conducted 
on a collection of software of this nature. The results 
gained from this study can be used to identify problem 
areas that exist and the factors that cause them. This study 
provides a foundation to the development of a solution to 
the problem of VPT. It is envisaged that a solution to 
VPT could be incorporated into current and future virtual 
world software.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section II provides 
background on the area of software inspection approaches 
and requirements. Section III present and details the three 
VWE selected for inspection, while Section IV describes 
inspection process and environment used. The set of 
inspection categories and objectives are presented in 
Section V. The inspection results are tabled and analyzed 
in Section VI. Section VII provides conclusions on this 
work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The general security issues associated with VWE have 
been examined in the past. However, this work was 
focused primarily on the game-play and social effects that 
activities like cheating and fraud have on users of such 
systems. These issues and their effects on the virtual 
economy within VWEs were discussed by Cikic et al. [6]. 
The security vulnerabilities of existing VWE client 
software has not been a focus of current research. 
Livshits and Lam [7] conducted an analysis of nine 
popular open source applications, they used a method of 
static analysis to perform their inspection and testing. 
They found that there were a total of 41 potential security 
violations in the 9 benchmarks and 29 of those turned out 
to be security errors and 12 were false positives. However 
this study did not focus on VWEs specifically but 
provides support that this technique is applicable to the 
testing of VWEs. 
A study to test the resilience of commercial virus 
scanning software packages was conducted by 
Christodorescu and Jha [8]. The aim of this study was to 
present architecture for detecting malicious patterns in 
executable files that are resilient to code-obfuscation 
attacks. To determine if an executable was resilient or 
not, they performed tests against three commercial virus 
scanners, the results showed that a combination of nop-
insertion and code transportation was all that was 
required to render a malicious executable undetectable by 
these virus scanners [8]. This study was useful from a 
security analysis point of view, but it did not cover VWEs 
specifically.  
Hole et al. [9] conducted a study on Norwegian 
internet banks from 2003 to 2004. Their aim was to 
determine if a false sense of security existed within bank 
customers and whether this contributes to an additional 
security risk in using online banking. They discovered 
that the customer authentication methods in many 
Norwegian Internet banks were weak, which allows 
simple but powerful attacks possible. This study 
presented an example of a successful attack that involved 
a PIN calculator (that was used by many Norwegian 
banks to generate new PINs for customers – based on 
certain period of time). In this attack it is possible to 
generate a timeline to associate a PIN number with a 
certain time interval and then employ brute force search 
to access customer accounts. This relates to our study in 
that one form of security may lead to users having a false 
sense of security. For example users of virtual world may 
get a false sense of security from their passwords, 
whereas their accounts can still be hacked into by the 
hackers/thieves. 
 A previous study conducted by Martin et al. [10] 
developed both static and dynamic techniques to find 
errors and security flaws to PQL (Program Query 
Language) queries.  They found 206 errors in 6 large real-
world open-source Java applications which contain a total 
of close to 60,000 classes [10]. Although this study did 
not focus on VWEs specifically more so on Java 
applications, it still relates and is useful to our study of 
analyzing applications (VWEs) for security flaws.  
Theory and techniques can be used from this study to 
flavor our analysis.  
Newsome and song conducted a study [11] which 
looked at using a technique called taint analysis, which 
can be used for automatic detection of overwrite attacks, 
which are the most commonly used type of security 
exploit.  They found that taint analysis regularly detected 
most types of exploits, producing no false positives in all 
the different commodity software programs they tested 
[11].  However for this study they did not discuss or 
analyze VWEs specifically, they tested several 
commodity programs (for example software available 
from a store, where the user does not know anything 
about the programs internet structure / source code).   
From existing literature, it appears that no work has 
been conducted on the security vulnerabilities of the 
VWE client software. A study of this nature would assist 
in determining the potential for security problem to exist 
within VWE software. In doing so, this study will help 
identify if such flaws are common with other software 
testing results and potentially showing that no software 
package can be completely secure. 
III. VIRTUAL WORLD ENVIRONMENT CHOICES 
There exists many hundreds of VWEs available to the 
public. The choice of VWEs for this study was based 
upon their popularity in terms of users (relevancy in 
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terms of are they a good representation of the many 
available); does the VWE have virtual property available 
to users, which can be traded or potentially stolen. The 
three VWEs selected to be inspected for this study 
included: World of Warcraft [12], Guild Wars [13] and 
Entropia Universe [14]. They are online VWEs for 
personal computer (PC) compatible computers.  Before 
we give broader details on these VWEs mentioned, a 
description of the system architecture used for VWEs is 
given, to help understand how they work from a technical 
point of view. 
 
 
Figure 1.  System architecture of VWEs [15] 
In Figure 1 shows the architecture of a general VWE in 
the view of a massively multiplayer online role playing 
game based virtual world.  VWEs are essentially client-
server based and as a result rely heavily on servers for 
processing.  In VWEs servers handle things such as 
interpretation of rules, maintenance of location and 
movement data [15].  The client actually does very little 
work in terms of processing of this data; often to prevent 
users on the client side from exploiting/cheating the 
VWE to give them a competitive advantage over other 
players [15].  A brief rundown of the architecture shown 
in Figure 1 is presented below: 
Client:  As mentioned VWEs are heavily reliant on a 
number of servers, however the user still needs some 
form of interface to interact with these servers and/or the 
VWE.  This is where the client comes in, it includes a 3D 
engine for rendering the virtual world visual content and 
a control interface for manipulating an avatar [15]. 
Login server: In order for users to gain access to a 
VWE of their choosing they often need a login and 
password.  The login server will handle the authentication 
of users, ensuring the user is who they claim to be.  Once 
the user is authenticated by the login server, they will 
connect to the game server. 
Game server: The purpose of this server is to enforce 
all the ‘game’ rules, collision detection, allow users to 
activate skills and attacks, as well as constantly recording 
their location and the movement of virtual property items 
[15]. 
Chat server: It is common in most VWEs to allow for 
text based communication between users.  Commonly all 
users of VWEs will connect automatically to a chat server 
as they enter the virtual world, therefore regardless where 
they are in the world; they can still communicate with 
any other user that is logged in, even if they are not in the 
same location. 
Databases: These are used to keep track of and save all 
the information, statistics, and inventory (virtual property 
items) with relation to avatars within the VWE [15].   
Website: It is common for most VWEs to have an 
associated website which allows users to view such 
things as avatar profiles and/or armory, forums, news and 
we are now seeing web based virtual property auction 
systems linked into the VWE. 
Patch server: Due to the complex nature of VWEs it is 
common for software updates to occur fairly often.  
These updates can be simple security fixes or content 
updates.  When an update comes available the patching 
server often will require users to connect and download 
any updates before any further use can continue. 
Zones: Due to VWEs being ‘massive’ in nature, it 
would be difficult and require a lot of data transfer to 
report to every client what is happening with every object 
and event in the virtual world [15].  This technique of 
zoning divides the actual virtual environment in different 
continents/areas each located on separate servers.  So 
essentially only users located in area X will receive 
reports/updates for that specific area and not users who 
are in areas Y or Z. 
A. World of Warcraf (WoW) 
World of Warcraft (WoW) [12] is an online role 
playing VWE released for personal computers in 2004 
with a user base consisting of 10’s of millions of users 
worldwide. As of late 2010 WoW had over 12 million 
subscribers – when they launched their second expansion 
named Wrath of the Lich King [16]. This VWE utilizes a 
subscription based model where users pay approximately 
US$15 a month in order to access the world. This VWE 
uses a client-server based model; where the user through 
a client interface application executing on their personal 
computer connects to a WoW server over the internet. In 
this VWE users can take on the role of a fantasy based 
character, through which they can explore and quest 
across a large virtual world. World of Warcraft can allow 
thousands of users to interact with each other in the same 
virtual world. Users can form relationships with other 
users and compete against each other for virtual currency 
or virtual property such as armor or weapons. 
B. Guild Wars (GW) 
Guild Wars (GW) [13] is also an online role playing 
environment which was released on the personal 
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computer in 2005. In 2009 this VWE had sold over 6 
million copies of the client software [17]. This VWE uses 
a client-server based model; where the user will utilize a 
client interface on their personal computer and then will 
connect to the server over the internet. A user is required 
to purchase the software but can play for free with no 
monthly subscription fee. Guild Wars is popular as it 
takes all the best aspects of other online games and 
combines them into a mission based design. Guild Wars 
allows users to create a fantasy based character in a 
virtual world and supports cooperative play. It also allows 
users to compete against each other for virtual currency 
and virtual property. 
C. Entropia Universe (EU) 
Entropia Universe (EU) [14] is a VWE that was 
designed by the company MindArk for the personal 
computer. It has grown to more than 1,000,000 registered 
accounts from over 200 countries or territories [18]. This 
VWE uses a client-server based model; where the user 
will utilize a client interface on their personal computer 
and then will connect to the server over the internet. The 
key reason for selecting this VWE is that the virtual 
economy is backed by real world money. It is currently 
the only VWE with a true Real Cash Economy (RCE) 
[18]. Entropia Universe employs a micropayment 
business model where players can play in the world for 
free but the company allows users to buy virtual 
currency, called Project Entropia Dollars or PED, which 
can then be traded back to the company for real world 
money. In Entropia Universe this means that virtual 
property and virtual currency has real world value, 
allowing users at any time to ‘cash out’ of the VWE. The 
better the user is at collecting virtual property in the 
world, the more money they can make outside of it. This 
VWE is an excellent choice for software inspection 
purposes since virtual property in this VWE has distinct 
value and many virtual property transaction occur in the 
VWE but also many real world transactions occur, in 
terms of ‘cash-outs’. 
IV. SOFTWARE INSPECTION PROCESS 
The software inspection process has been used 
extensively as a common process for debugging and 
improving source code quality [19]. A related method is 
that of usability inspection, which is a popular way to 
evaluate user interfaces [19].  
The method of inspection used in this paper is a 
combination of software and usability inspection 
techniques. The software inspection process used in this 
study will be that of operational software inspection, a 
process that typically involves a group of individuals. In 
this instance one individual (the first author) is used to 
examine the software to find defects or security 
vulnerabilities, which are often the result of one or many 
design or operational faults.  
The test environment used for this operational software 
inspection process took place in the School of IT at 
Deakin University (Waurn Ponds campus). The test 
computer system (PC based system running a default 
Deakin University installation of Windows XP) is located 
on this campus, utilizing the universities network 
connection to the internet.  
The VWEs being inspected were installed into the 
~/Program Files/ directory on the test computer. 
Additional software based tools that were used for testing 
included: Sniphere, Wireshark and Actual Keylogger 
(discussed more in Section 5). 
For inspection purposes no security measures will be 
in place apart from those inbuilt into the VWE’s being 
inspected. All firewalls and antivirus software will be 
disabled on the inspection computer. This is to try and 
mimic the greater population of personal computers 
running VWE clients, where some may have security and 
some may not. 
This operational software inspection consists of a 
clearly defined agenda and set of requirements for the 
inspection process. The set of inspection categories and 
the sets of tools utilized are presented next. 
V. INSPECTION CATEGORIES 
This section will outline the categories of testing that 
will occur on the selected VWEs. These categories were 
chosen as a result of a literature review conducted in the 
overall research project and determined as the most 
crucial areas of concern that relate to VPT and how it 
occurs. Firstly authentication will be focused on, as this is 
the users primary method of gaining access to a VWE, 
and in order to conduct theft; thieves have to break the 
authentication to gain access to victims accounts. 
Secondly detection will be focused on; in order to 
conduct theft there is often a specific signature of events 
that occur for this to be successful. If you can detect 
when theft is occurring you can stop it and prevent the 
virtual property from being stolen.  Lastly recovery will 
be focused on, this is the last resort. If theft does occur 
and virtual goods are stolen; can users get them back 
effectively and in a timely fashion or are they lost 
forever? 
A. Authentication 
Authentication is the process of proving or confirming 
by the VWE server that an individual attempting to login 
to an environment is authentic and the actual owner of the 
account being accessed. Authentication is a vital 
component of most online or offline digital environments 
including VWEs, as it directly relates to being able to 
access a user’s account and the virtual property within it. 
Authentication can come in the form of passwords, 
biometrics and digital signatures. The aspects we wish to 
inspect here are password sniffing, password robustness 
and keylogging. 
1) Network Password Sniffing  
This technique works by attempting to view the 
password as it is sent from the client to the server. This 
test will determine if encryption is used to send the 
username and password to the login server. The software 
used to do this testing will be Sniphere version 2.0 [20]. 
The process will involve launching the virtual world 
software and then starting the sniffing software, then 
proceeding to login to the server and analyzing if the 
password is sent unencrypted. 
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2) Password Robustness  
This process will not be automatic and will work by 
manually entering in commonly used passwords until one 
is accepted. This is to determine the robustness required 
for client passwords in VWE’s. This works due to people 
in general choosing easy to remember words as their 
password; for example pets name or family name. The 
technique used for this will be getting an assistant to set 
the password to the test account; making it unknown to 
the tester. The tester will then use a dictionary file of 
commonly used passwords and using human input to see 
if one is accepted. Risk can be determined in the results 
by looking at if the VWE operator requires the user to set 
a specific kind of password, for example 8 characters and 
combination of letters and numbers. 
3) Keylogging 
This technique is executed by utilizing a Trojan type 
program to monitor keystrokes on a user’s computer 
system. This is a popular attack used to gain unauthorized 
access to user accounts in many popular VWEs. The 
testing application for this will involve the use of 
legitimate key logging software named Actual Keylogger 
[21], it will involve the monitoring of keystrokes as the 
authentication procedure is performed on each VWE, to 
determine if username and password can be captured. 
B. Virtual Property Trading 
Virtual property trading relates to the trade between 
users of virtual property within the VWE. Trade can 
occur in many different ways such as direct trade between 
two avatars (virtual characters), sending virtual property 
through an in-world mail system as well as buying and 
selling at an in-world auction house or multi user trade 
interface; which is a common feature in most of these 
VWEs. Once a computer criminal gains unauthorized 
access to a user account, these transactions allow them to 
steal virtual property from one account and send it off to 
another which they own. The aspects we wish to inspect 
here are mail trading, direct trading and aspects of multi-
user trade mechanisms. 
1) Direct Trading 
Direct trading is the process whereby user X will open 
up a trade window dialog box with user Y and transfer 
virtual property directly. This requires both user X and Y 
to be online within the world at the same time and 
essentially provides a real time way of transferring virtual 
property. The aim of this test is to determine if virtual 
property items can be directly traded effectively without 
any security mechanisms or restrictions in place to ensure 
they are not being stolen. 
2) Mail Trading 
Mail trading involves user X wishing to send an item 
to user Y; commonly they send an electronic mail from 
within the VWE which often contains a message and the 
virtual property item/s. This mail system is often used 
when user Y is offline or not available for a normal trade 
window scenario. This is considered a quick and 
convenient option for players but can provide an easy 
avenue for unauthorized users to transfer virtual property 
to another account which they own without requiring 
them to be logged in on two different accounts at the 
same time. The aim of this test is to determine if virtual 
property items can be traded through mail based systems 
effectively without any security mechanisms or 
restrictions in place to ensure they are not being stolen. 
3) Multi-user Interface Trading 
In many of the VWEs looked at for this study; multi 
user trade interfaces such as an auction house are 
prevalent within them. An auction house is usually a 
virtual building within the world, where users can walk in 
and talk to a NPC (Non Player Character) avatar and 
place virtual property up for auction in order to sell and 
potentially make some profit. A thief might utilize this 
means; whereby they will have two accounts, one being 
their own account and one being a compromised account.  
The thief will then log into the compromised account; 
access one of the characters owned by that user and 
proceed to place virtual property up for auction for a 
small price and then buy it on their own legitimate 
account; providing a means to launder the property to 
make it seem like an innocent transaction. The aim of this 
test is to determine if virtual property items can be traded 
through multi-user trade interface based systems 
effectively without any security mechanisms or 
restrictions in place to ensure they are not being stolen. 
C. Intruder Detection 
Intruder detection is the process of detecting intruders 
or in this case potential thieves as they aim to gain access 
to unauthorized accounts. If a thief or hacker is not 
detected by the VWE software, they can break into many 
accounts and steal virtual goods without being noticed 
until the owner logs in to discover this theft has occurred. 
If an unauthorized user can be detected before entry to 
the VWE is permitted, many of the thefts can be stopped. 
The aspects we wish to inspect here will be looking at 
failed login attempts, unusual internet protocol addresses, 
unusual MAC addresses, and the software version the 
time of login and can they log onto an account at the 
same time as the user is currently logged in. 
1) Login Attempts 
This test will be performed during the authentication or 
login process, whereby the numerous failed attempts at 
logging in will be conducted and then determine if the 
VWE actually locks the user out of the account all 
together for conducting numerous failed attempts. 
Detection will be asserted TRUE if the account is locked 
after a certain amount of logins at that time. 
2) IP Address  
This test will conduct logging into a test account of a 
particular VWE numerous times from one class-B IP 
address, and then proceed to logon with a completely 
different class-B IP address using a foreign proxy address 
and then analyze if this is detected in any way. Therefore 
detection will be asserted TRUE if the account is locked 
at that exact moment or a number of days later. 
3) MAC Address 
This test will conduct logging into a test account of a 
particular VWE numerous times from a test computer 
with a specific MAC address and then proceed to logon 
from a completely different computer with a different 
MAC address and then analyze if that is detected in any 
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way. Therefore detection will be asserted TRUE if the 
account is locked at that exact moment or a number of 
days later. 
4) Login Time / Zone 
This test will be performed by logging into a test 
account of a particular VWE a number of times at a set 
time each day for a period of time, and after that period 
proceed to login at completely different times. Analysis 
will determine if the account gets suspended due to usage 
times being drastically different time zones. 
5) Concurrent Access 
One important factor is to determine, can a potential 
thief login to your account at the same time you are 
logged in? If so this could present some dangers in terms 
of having all your items stolen, while you’re actually still 
logged in. This test will be conducted by logging into a 
test account of a particular VWE, then attempting to login 
to that same VWE with the exact same username and 
password. This is to determine if there are measures in 
place to stop two individuals from logging into the same 
account twice concurrently. 
D. Recovery 
Recovery relates to the reacquisition of stolen virtual 
property by the original owner. Virtual property often has 
great value associated with it by the owner; this is due to 
it often taking great amounts of time and effort to gather, 
not to mention the user is often paying a subscription fee 
to play within the VWE. When an item is stolen from a 
user’s account, it is highly beneficial to return the 
property back to the original owner without a lengthy 
process as this involves human interaction by staff, 
costing money to the company since there could be many 
of these recovery sessions to do per day. The process of 
recovering stolen virtual property needs to be done 
accurately so that all individuals involved in the theft are 
compensated for any innocent transactions or example if 
a thief is selling stolen items on a virtual world auction 
house system and innocent users are spending virtual 
currency to buy these goods without knowing they are 
stolen.  
The aspects inspected here relate to using a scenario 
based method where theft will be simulated and then 
requests will be issued to determine if VWE operators 
can recover the stolen property. More precisely, this 
series of tests looks at recovery of virtual property after it 
has been reported or detected as stolen. The only test here 
will consist of using VWE operators (administrators) to 
assist in the recovery of the stolen property. The aim of 
this test is to discover if virtual property can be recovered 
in the VWE or if it will remain stolen for good.  
This experiment was designed to replicate a real VPT 
(and in need of recovery) situation as much as possible.  
Our aim was to design the experiments in a way that they 
would appear to the VWE operator to be a legitimate 
theft and recovery situation and not a mock scenario.  The 
VWE operators from each individual VWE did not have 
any affiliation with the tester or knew of this experiment 
beforehand. This experiment breaks down to essentially, 
conducting a theft of a number of rare virtual property 
items between two individual unassociated accounts 
(thief and victim), then placing a request on the victims 
account using an online help system featured in-world; 
asking if the stolen virtual property items could be 
recovered and returned.  Whereby the VWE operator 
would outright deny the request or conduct some 
investigation and recover the stolen virtual property items 
returning them back to the victim account. 
As discussed above the inspection process for this test 
was essentially the same for all three VWEs. This 
involved having two independent user accounts for each 
VWE analyzed. These accounts were not related in any 
way to ensure that the act of VPT (performed entirely by 
the tester) was viewed as a legitimate act of theft between 
two separate entities by the VWE operator. This was 
achieved by registering these accounts under 
acquaintances of the tester.  
These two individual accounts are logged into from 
two different Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Each 
account will have an avatar created for it, and each avatar 
will be setup with a number of virtual property items of 
varying quality. 
 The process will involve the avatar from the first 
account trading; two to three virtual property items and 
virtual currency to the avatar from the second account 
using a direct trade mechanism. The first avatar will wait 
24 hours and then report these items as stolen and request 
recovery.  Due to the recovery process being textual 
conversing (through the online help feature) between 
mock victim and VWE operator entity, to validate if a test 
was successful or not, we utilized simple visualization to 
analyze whether or not the VWE operator was able to 
complete the recovery of our stolen virtual property 
items. This was answered by the operator entity either 
outright denying the request by using such phrases as 
“Sorry we are unable to complete your request” or 
accepting the request, doing some investigation and 
placing the stolen goods back into our inventory. An 
assertion value of TRUE or FALSE was recorded if the 
property is returned or not, respectively. 
VI. RESULTS 
There are two main methods of risk analysis and one 
hybrid method. First we have qualitative; this aims to 
improve the awareness of information systems security 
problems and the position of the system being analyzed 
[22]. Secondly we have quantitative; this is the 
identification of where security controls should be 
implemented, as well as the cost it will take to implement 
them [22]. Lastly the hybrid method is a combination of 
both the first two methods, and can be used to implement 
the components and use the available information all 
while minimizing the metrics to be collected and 
calculated [22]. The hybrid method is generally 
considered a less intensive and expensive method, 
compared to in-depth analysis. 
This study will use qualitative analysis, it is considered 
much simpler and more widely used [22]. The goal of this 
study is to identify the parts of VWEs that are at risk and 
the vulnerabilities that might allow those threats to be 
realized, so this makes qualitative analysis perfect for this 
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situation. The analysis in this study will use simple 
calculations and procedures which will determine the 
impact, probability and overall risk evaluation associated 
with these threats. 
Each test category was broken down into 
authentication, virtual property trading, intruder detection 
and virtual property recovery. Each test involved 
specifying what was evaluated, in which VWE, if the test 
was successful or not (assertion), what probability of this 
threat is, what the impact will be if it occurs, and then 
provide the overall outcome in terms of risk value 
(calculation of assertion, probability and impact) and 
evaluation. The tables of results in this study will list the 
assertion (Table I), probability (Table II), impact (Table 
III), risk (Table IV) and evaluation (Table V) outcomes. 
A. Assertion 
This is a simple test and is evaluated by determining if 
the aim of the test failed or was successful. A value of 
‘true’ will be given if the test was successful and a value 
of ‘false’ will assigned if unsuccessful. The assertion 
results for each of the inspection categories: 
Authentication, Unauthorized Trade, and Intruder 
Detection; as presented in the previous section are shown 
in Table I. 
B. Probability 
A risk is an event that ‘may’ occur.  This is evaluated by 
judging based upon knowledge or belief, how possible it 
is that a particular risk will occur.  The probability of this 
risk occurring will be given a value of ‘low’, ‘medium’ or 
‘high’ by the tester.  The probability value is based upon 
knowledge or belief by the tester on how possible it is 
that a threat could occur.  Note: It cannot be exactly 
certain or uncertain to occur or it wouldn’t be classified 
as a risk. 
• A value of ‘low’ will be assigned when the 
probability is at a point where it is so low that it 
is very unlikely to occur.   
• A value of ‘medium’ will be assigned when the 
probability is at a point where it is considered 
possible to occur.  
• A value of ‘high’ will be given when the 
probability is at a point where it is very certain 
that it will occur.  
C. Impact 
A risk by nature will always have a negative impact.  The 
rating of the impact depends on factors such as in this 
case: value of the virtual property items stolen, chance of 
recovering the items and the victim’s emotional impact.  
Impact will also take into consideration, what the 
potential result will be of this threat occurring? A value 
of ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high will be given by the tester 
which represents the impact. 
• A value of ‘low’ will be assigned when the 
impact of the threat being successful will not 
result in the act of VPT.  The result here can 
often be ignored as the threat will provide little 
or no impact. 
• A value of ‘medium’ will be assigned when the 
impact of the attack being successful could 
result in VPT occurring.  The result concluding 
from the impact of this threat can be managed 
effectively. 
• A value of ‘high’ will be assigned when the 
impact of the threat being successful will almost 
certainly result in VPT occurring.  The impact 
here is something you want to pay close 
attention too, as it will often result in misfortune 
in the form of VPT. 
D. Risk 
This is evaluated by how easily the assertion was 
achieved, combining the probability of the attack 
occurring and the impact if the attack occurs. A value of 
‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ will be given. Figure 1 shows a 
risk matrix applicable in qualitative risk analysis; the 
threat level comprises of the probability or likelihood and 
impact of a risk. Probability is the chance that the risk 
will occur. Impact is the amount of damage that it would 
do were it to occur [23]. 
TABLE I.  AUTHENTICATION TESTS – ASSERTION RESULTS 
 Authentication Assertion Unauthorized Trade Assertion Intruder Detection Assertion 
 Password 
Sniffing 
Password 
Robust 
Key-
logging 
Mail 
Trade 
Direct 
Trade MUT 
Failed 
Logins Multi-IPs 
Multi-
MACs 
Login 
Time 
Concurre
nt Access 
WoW False True True True True True False True True True False 
GW False False True True True True False True True True False 
EU False True True False True True False True True True False 
TABLE II.  AUTHENTICATION TESTS – ATTRIBUTED PROBABILITY 
 Authentication Probability Unauthorized Trade Probability Intruder Detection Probability 
 Password 
Sniffing 
Password 
Robust 
Key-
logging 
Mail 
Trade 
Direct 
Trade MUT 
Failed 
Logins Multi-IPs 
Multi-
MACs 
Login 
Time 
Concurre
nt Access 
WoW Low Medium High High High Medium Low High High High Low 
GW Low Medium High High High Medium Low High High High Low 
EU Low Medium High Low High Medium Low High High High Low 
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TABLE III.  AUTHENTICATION TESTS – ATTRIBUTED IMPACT 
 Authentication Impact Unauthorized Trade Impact Intruder Detection Impact 
 Password 
Sniffing 
Password 
Robust 
Key-
logging 
Mail 
Trade 
Direct 
Trade MUT 
Failed 
Logins Multi-IPs 
Multi-
MACs 
Login 
Time 
Concurre
nt Access 
WoW High High High High High Medium High High Medium Medium High 
GW High High High High High Medium High High Medium Medium High 
EU High High High High High Medium High High Medium Medium High 
TABLE IV.  AUTHENTICATION TESTS – ATTRIBUTED RISKS 
 Authentication Risk Unauthorized Trade Risk Intruder Detection Risk 
 Password 
Sniffing 
Password 
Robust 
Key-
logging 
Mail 
Trade 
Direct 
Trade MUT 
Failed 
Logins Multi-IPs 
Multi-
MACs 
Login 
Time 
Concurre
nt Access 
WoW Medium High Critical Critical Critical Medium Medium Critical High High Medium 
GW Medium High Critical Critical Critical Medium Medium Critical High High Medium 
EU Medium High Critical Critical Critical Medium Medium Critical High High Medium 
TABLE V.  AUTHENTICATION TESTS – EVALUATION RESULTS 
 Authentication Evaluation Unauthorized Trade Evaluation Intruder Detection Evaluation 
 Password 
Sniffing 
Password 
Robust 
Key-
logging 
Mail 
Trade 
Direct 
Trade MUT 
Failed 
Logins Multi-IPs 
Multi-
MACs 
Login 
Time 
Concurre
nt Access 
WoW Controllable Secure 
Needs 
Attention 
Needs 
Attention 
Needs 
Attention 
Controlla
ble Secure Secure 
Controlla
ble 
Controlla
ble 
Controll
able 
GW Controllable Secure 
Needs 
Attention 
Needs 
Attention 
Needs 
Attention 
Controlla
ble Secure 
Controlla
ble 
Controlla
ble 
Controlla
ble 
Controll
able 
EU Controllable Secure 
Needs 
Attention Secure 
Needs 
Attention 
Controlla
ble Secure 
Controlla
ble 
Controlla
ble 
Controlla
ble 
Controll
able 
 
 
Figure 2.  A decision matrix to determine risk rating [23] 
• A value of ‘low’ will be assigned when the risk is 
at a point where it is so low that there is no 
apparent threat or danger to the user in terms of 
VPT. When determining a risk rating of low, both 
the probability and impact will go towards giving 
an ultimate value. In Figure 2 these are shown as 
"green" risks; these are insignificant and most 
likely will not result in VPT. 
• A value of ‘medium’ will be assigned when the 
risk is at a point where it is considered a 
possibility that the user in danger of theft. When 
determining a risk rating of medium, both the 
probability and impact will go towards giving an 
ultimate value. In Figure 2 these are shown as 
“yellow" risks; they can have a major impact in 
terms of VPT but if they are managed well by the 
VWE operators, they can be mitigated. 
• A value of ‘high’ will be assigned when the risk 
is at a point where it is considered very likely to 
occur and will provide an impact in terms of 
VPT. When determining a risk rating of high, 
both the probability and impact will go towards 
giving an ultimate value. In Figure 2 these are 
shown as “orange” risks, these are of high 
concern which can lead to virtual property theft, 
but not of critical concern. 
• A value of ‘critical will be assigned when the risk 
is of such a large scale that the user is very likely 
to be in danger of this threat. When determining a 
risk rating of high both the probability and impact 
will go towards giving an ultimate value. In 
Figure 2 these are shown as “red” risks and often 
occur when the VWE software or VWE operators 
are either unfamiliar with the risk or have no way 
of stopping it at all, so therefore resulting in a 
high frequency of VPT. 
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E. Evaluation 
Each individual VWE that was analyzed will receive a 
security evaluation.  This is evaluated by a combination 
of assertion, risk and the testers experience and 
knowledge.  The evaluation will be given a determination 
of ‘needs attention’, ‘manageable’, or ‘secure’. 
• A determination of ‘secure’ will be assigned 
when the evaluation of the test is at a point 
where the problem or threat is considered 
negligible and improbable that it will be 
exploited and generally safe from the chance of 
VPT. 
• A determination of ‘controllable’ will be 
assigned when the evaluation of the test is at a 
point where the problem is considered probable 
to happen and may be exploited.   
• A determination of ‘needs attention’ will be 
assigned when the evaluation of the test is at a 
point where the problem is considered so high 
that it is very probable that it will be exploited 
and presents high concern regarding VPT. 
F. Authentication Risk 
Authentication deals with processes that relate to when 
the user is logging into a VWE. The tests associated with 
authentication, look at password sniffing, password 
robustness and keylogging and how much of a risk 
exploiting vulnerabilities in these areas present. 
In Table II the authentication risk of each of these 
security concerns is shown, categorized with the VWE 
that the test was performed on. As you can see from this 
table  the risk associated with password sniffing for each 
VWE is quite low, so there is very small chance that a 
users password could be intercepted between the client 
and server by a third party. The next risk being password 
robustness displayed that the password requirements and 
complexity required by each VWE is of mid level, thus 
reducing the chance a user’s password could be gathered 
via brute force techniques. When it comes to the last risk 
being key-logging, as shown in the graph this is a large 
problem for all VWE’s and users computers alike. 
Keyloggers fall under the category of malicious software 
and thus users should keep up to date antivirus and anti 
malware software on their personal computers as well as 
not visiting strange websites where key-loggers could be 
automatically downloaded. Overall the risk associated 
with authentication presents a high risk (medium 
probability and high impact) concern to all VWEs tested 
and can be dealt with some small provisions such as 
awareness and security software for user’s personal 
computers such as anti-virus and anti malware 
G. Trade Risk 
Unauthorized trading deals with mechanics within the 
VWE which allow virtual property to be traded from one 
avatar to another. The tests associated with unauthorized 
trading involved mechanisms such as at mail trade, direct 
trading between avatars and multi-user trading.  
In Table II the risk associated with each of these 
trading techniques is shown, categorized with each VWE 
that was analyzed. From the graph; mail trade is a critical 
risk (high probability and high impact) for World of 
Warcraft and Guild Wars, but is a low risk for Entropia 
Universe, due to the fact EU has no active mail trading 
mechanism. Mail trading can be used by for virtual 
property thieves to trade virtual property items without 
requiring a second avatar to be logged in at the same time 
to be used as a form of bank for stolen goods.  
The next risk, direct trading, allows direct avatar to 
avatar trading and represents a critical risk (high 
probability and high impact) for all VWEs. This option in 
the testers belief is the most likely option to be used as a 
form of theft mechanics in VWE as it allows for real time 
trading of stolen goods, enabling thieves to log into a 
potential stolen account and at the same time be logged 
into a separate account they own, then send valuable 
virtual goods from the stolen account in real time and 
then log out. The last risk, multi-user trading, deals with 
looking at trade mechanisms which allow thieves to send 
virtual items to many different users, and be used as a 
form of laundering or attempting to bring legitimacy to 
the trade of stolen goods. Overall the risk of unauthorized 
trading presents a medium (medium probability and 
medium impact) concern for all VWEs looked at and 
represents unauthorized trading can occur quite easily 
once an unauthorized user has gained access to an 
account. 
H. Intruder Detection 
Intrusion detection deals with being able to detect 
unauthorized users that attempt to gain access to a 
legitimate users account for the purpose of virtual 
property theft. The tests associated with intrusion 
detection are failed login attempts, unusual internet 
protocol address (IP), unusual media access control 
address (MAC), unusual login times and concurrent login 
attempts.  
In Table II the risk associated with each of these 
intrusion detection techniques is shown, correlated with 
each VWE that was analyzed. For all the VWEs tested it 
was shown that when an individual attempts a login a 
number of times and fails, it was detected and the account 
suspended for a time period, presenting medium risk from 
attacks such as automated brute force or a thief trying to 
guess a users password by hand. The next test was to 
determine if the VWE detected that a user had an unusual 
IP address than what had been used in the past and 
initializes any measures to accommodate that. The result 
of that test was that the risk is very high and no measures 
were taken by the VWE to stop a user from logging in 
from a completely different IP address. 
The next test shown in Table II was similar to the IP 
address test but in fact looked at the MAC address, which 
is a unique identifier for network interfaces and each 
computer has a unique one of these. The result of the test 
was that no measures were taken by the VWE to stop a 
user from logging in from another computer with a 
completely different MAC address. Therefore the risk is 
classified as high. The next test as shown in Table II 
looked at if the VWE took any measures to detect if a 
user was logging in at an unusual time, differing than 
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what they usually are on at, say logging in at 3AM as 
opposed to what they normally log in at being 6 PM for 
example. The result of this test was the risk was of high 
concern and no measures were taken by the VWE to alert 
VWE operators of strange login times on a users account. 
The final test as shown in Table II analyzed if two 
individuals could login to the same account on the same 
VWE, at the same time concurrently. In all VWEs this 
proved to be secure, no two accounts can be logged in at 
the same time. What occurs is simply the current person 
logged in, is disconnected once the second attempt is 
successful in authentication. The result here is therefore 
of medium risk, due to the fact it does actually stop two 
individuals from being logged in at the same time but 
does not prevent a hacker from logging into a stolen 
account, then whereby the system disconnects the owner 
off the account and the hacker can steal virtual property 
items of his choosing until getting disconnected. A better 
developers may implement would be to not disconnect 
the current active user if say a hacker is trying to login to 
the account in question. If the owner of an account is 
logged in and becomes disconnected from the internet, a 
timer of inactivity could be issued, whereby the account 
will become automatically logged out after say 6 minutes; 
then they could log back in. 
Overall intrusion detection is for the most part a very 
high risk for all VWEs looked at; in most instances there 
are no detection mechanisms in place or there is no 
follow up when flags are triggered (such as unusual IP 
address, unusual MAC address, strange login times, 
concurrent logins); allowing thieves to freely venture in 
and out of stolen accounts without risk of being detected. 
I. Scenarios: Virtual Property Theft Recovery 
Recovery mechanics looks at the evaluation of the 
recovery tests and if they were able to be achieved or not.  
In Table III a series of recovery tests were performed on 
all VWEs chosen and as a result a success or failure 
measure was given. An evaluation result is given in this 
table also, which presents the authors evaluation as to 
whether the system being scrutinized is effective or 
ineffective. 
TABLE VI.  RECOVERY SCENARIO TESTS 
 
Virtual Property Recovery Scenarios 
Success Failure Evaluation 
WoW (0 from 3) 0% (3 from 3) 100% Ineffective 
GW (0 from 3) 0% (3 from 3) 100% Ineffective 
EU (0 from 3) 0% (3 from 3) 100% Ineffective 
As shown in Table III each of the virtual property 
recovery tests were performed at varying times and they 
all failed. This represents a high degree of inability for 
VWE operators to recover virtual property once it is 
stolen by thieves. 
J. Scenarios: Virtual Property Theft Detection 
A set of virtual property theft scenarios were 
performed to determine once a theft occurred, if the VWE 
software or VWE operator was able to detect it occurring, 
and stop it from resulting in theft. In Table IV a series of 
theft tests were performed on all VWEs chosen and as a 
result a success or failure measure was given.  An 
evaluation result is given in this table also, which 
presents the authors evaluation as to whether the system 
being scrutinized is effective or ineffective.  A measure 
of ‘success’ determines if the scenario was able to be 
achieved, a measure of ‘failure’ determines that the 
scenario was not able to be completed.  Regarding the 
evaluation, a measure of ineffective determines that the 
VWE in question was not able to detect or stop the 
particular occurrence of VPT and a measure of effective 
determines that it was. 
TABLE VII.  VIRTUAL PROPERTY THEFT SCENARIO TESTS 
 
Virtual Property Theft Scenarios 
Success Failure Evaluation 
WoW (4 from 4) 100% (0 from 4) 0% Ineffective 
GW (4 from 4) 100% (0 from 4) 0% Ineffective 
EU (4 from 4) 100% (0 from 4) 0% Ineffective 
 
As shown in Table IV all the theft scenarios were 
successful, representing that theft was able to be 
performed without being detected by the VWE software 
or VWE operator whilst it is occurring. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
This section provides a discussion on results from our 
study and assists in determining such things as what are 
common security issues for other systems, how defective 
are VWEs compared to other systems and are the 
developers or the users at fault for security issues. 
Livshits and Lam [7] conducted an analysis of nine 
particular Java based open source applications using the 
method of static analysis.  Their aim was to show that the 
security of web applications is very important and that 
there is much vulnerability that still exists in these 
applications, which is of high concern. They found 29 
security errors and vulnerabilities in the area of SQL 
injection, cross-site scripting, HTTP splitting attacks and 
other types of vulnerabilities such as tainted object 
propagation problems [7]. This relates to our study where 
we found a number of security vulnerabilities in the areas 
of authentication, unauthorized trade and intruder 
detection; in terms of the VWEs we tested, WoW had 8 
security vulnerabilities, GW and EU both had 7 security 
vulnerabilities of varying degrees. 
Christodorescu and Jha [8] conducted a study on the 
resilience of commercial virus scanning packages with 
the aim of presenting an architecture for detecting 
malicious patterns in executable files which specifically 
are resilient to code-obfuscation (obfuscated code is 
source code which has deliberately been made difficult to 
understand by humans) attacks.  In this study they tested 
three commercial virus scanning applications using the 
obfuscated versions of four known viruses.  Their results 
used a combination of nop-insertion and code 
transportation techniques in order to create obfuscated 
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versions of the four viruses, this proved to be enough to 
bypass detection by commercial virus scanners [8].  One 
specific result showed that a well known  antivirus 
package (Norton antivirus) could not detect an obfuscated 
version of the devastating Chernobyl virus using the nop-
insertion technique [8].  This relates to our findings 
where detection has proven to be a major concern, 
specifically in the three commercial VWEs we tested.  
These VWEs were unable to detect unwanted intruders in 
all cases (Table I) and unable to detect VPT when we 
performed our scenario tests (Table VII). 
Hole et al. [9] conducted a study on Norwegian 
internet banks in the years 2003 to 2004 with the aim of 
determining if a false sense of security existed within the 
customers of banks, specifically with relation to online 
banking .  This study they found that the authentication 
systems used to logon to net banking were quite weak, 
allowing a number of simple attacks to be conducted 
which provided fruitful results [9].  These results also 
concluded that many of Norway’s Internet banking 
systems  which consist of more than 1 million customers 
were in fact vulnerable to a combination of DDoS 
(distributed denial of service) and brute force attacks 
during the years 2003 to 2004 [9].  This relates to our 
study in the fact that one of the vulnerabilities that virtual 
world developers were actually able to secure, was the 
technique of brute forcing passwords.  As shown in Table 
I, not one of the three commercial VWEs were 
susceptible to brute forcing authentication; most would 
lock the account after 5 login attempts.  However Hole et 
al. [9] proved that even systems that close account access 
after 5 failed login attempts such as the 3 commercial 
VWEs in our study and similarly Norwegian banks 
(which on top of this also have two-factor 
authentication); can still be broken into.  In their 
experiment with two Norwegian banks which locked 
accounts after 5 failed login attempts, they produced an 
average of 38 cracked accounts and the possibility of 
repeatedly attacking the bank which would crack new 
accounts each time [9]. 
Martin et al. [10]  conducted an analysis on 6 large 
real-world open source Java applications, which 
contained close to 60,000 classes.  The techniques by 
which they conducted this analysis was utilizing PQL 
(Program Query Language) queries (PQL queries allows 
developers to express a large class of application specific 
code patterns [10]) with a combination of static and 
dynamic techniques.  They discovered through their 
analysis of these real-world Java applications utilizing 
these techniques that there were 206 errors which were 
categorized into security flaws, resource leaks and 
violations of consistency invariants [10].  They concluded 
that combining PQL, static and dynamic analysis can be 
effective at preventing errors such as security 
vulnerabilities at runtime (when the program is first 
launched).  However, our findings were more effective at 
detecting errors or security flaws whilst the program was 
in operation. Through the use of the operational software 
inspection technique we found a total of 22 errors with 
the 3 commercial VWEs analyzed, which were 
categorized into authentication, virtual property trading 
and intrusion detection.  Furthermore, we discovered 3 
failed attempts at virtual property recovery (Table V) and 
4 failed attempts at detecting VPT (Table VI). 
Newsome and Song [11] conducted a study on 
software vulnerabilities and their effect on the internet.  
They state that internet attacks are quite fast and 
automatic in nature, so in order to stop them there would 
need to be fast detection and filtering mechanisms [11].  
In their study they propose a technique called dynamic 
taint analysis, which automatically detects overwrite 
attacks (overwrite attacks are the most common type of 
exploit) [11].  The authors used taint analysis to detect a 
number of different attacks; which combined both 
synthetic and actual real exploits. Their technique 
successfully detected all the attacks and attempted 
exploitation they performed.  To correlate our findings to 
this study, the 3 VWEs we analyzed were not as 
successful in detecting a number of attacks we performed 
such as the VPT scenario attacks we performed as shown 
in Table VII.  On top of this in all 3 VWEs, the detection 
of intruders who had a different IP or MAC address and 
login/activity time than the owner of the account failed 
completely (Table I). 
VIII. POTENTIAL GAIN 
The potential gain from addressing the problems that are 
persistent within the VWEs, which have been examined 
in this paper, is finding a solution to solve flaws existing 
in VWEs. And to achieve that this paper provides a vital 
discussion into determining why the flaws exist and how 
they are being used to conduct VPT. This paper  Below is 
a more detailed list of potential gains that can come from 
fixing the flaws in VWE software. 
• Limit or neutralize VPT from occurring:  
Fundamentally as a whole, stopping virtual 
property thieves from having free reign once an 
account is compromised, allowing theft of as 
many virtual property items as possible. 
• Reduction in the black market of virtual property 
sales: Fewer occurrences of stolen virtual 
property items will result in thieves having less to 
sell on the black market. 
• Account security more prevalent: Both users and 
virtual world operators become well versed in 
account security, reducing the occurrence of 
account theft and to less cases of VPT. 
• Reduced costs of customer service, potential for 
development: This means virtual world operators 
will less load of customer service to deal with 
theft reports, allowing them to put more funding 
into development of content. 
• Virtual world user-base will be safer and happier.  
The user-base can go about their virtual world 
activities, collect virtual property and currency 
without fear of it all being stolen by thieves.  As a 
result subscriptions will continue and grow. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Virtual world software is considered one of the most 
complex forms of software that exist today; it is 
essentially a large piece of enterprise software that 
consists of databases, specialized servers, client software, 
often millions of users and a huge amount of content. 
This complexity has presented points of vulnerability to 
many security problems that have existed for some time 
in VWE software for with the most part with no effective 
solutions being produced. People indulging in personal 
entertainment through buying VWE software and often 
paying a subscription fee per month should view these 
results, and then demand VWE operators improve 
security before the software is given global availability. 
Solutions to most of these problems can be moderately 
simple for a VWE development team. This small 
investment of time and effort and can quite potentially 
reduce VPT significantly.  
There are some key intrinsic factors existing within 
VWEs which can lead to security compromise. One of 
these fundamental flaws with VWE software is primitive 
authentication features which allow key logging to be one 
off, if not the most fruitful, technique for stealing VWE 
accounts (which often then leads to VPT).  From then on 
the ability for VWE software or operators to not only 
detect an account intrusion or detect a VPT situation is 
essentially nonexistent, allowing the theft to occur with 
no resistance.  Lastly the ability for VWE operators to be 
able to recover and return victims (often hard earned) 
virtual property items is nonexistent according to our 
investigation results.  Therefore we have in all areas of 
authentication, unauthorized trading, intrusion detection 
and recovery mechanisms we have inherent flaws ranging 
from medium to critical risk to users of these VWEs. 
Until better security development practices are in place 
and thorough testing of VWE software (as shown in this 
study) from a security point of view occurs on VWE 
software by their creators, users should take valid 
measures to protect their ‘investment’. Some of these 
measures that can be implemented by users to enhance 
security and avoid VPT are as simple as up to date anti-
virus or anti malware software to prevent key-loggers and 
Trojans, changing your password frequently (bi-weekly, 
dependant on how much virtual property items you own) 
so if a potential thief does obtain a users login details, 
they will have changed the password hopefully before the 
thief gains access.  Measures which can be utilized by 
VWEs to improve security and protect their community 
base are more up to date and secure authentication 
mechanisms along with effective intrusion detection and 
VPT detection systems, to not only avoid account 
intrusion but also if required detect VPT and stop it 
before it can occur. This study is crucial as it highlights 
the flaws and points out what needs to be fixed in VWEs. 
Overall the results gained from the set of tests presented 
in section 6 demonstrated that there are key areas of 
VWE software that require focus to improve security and 
reduce the chances of virtual property theft occurring.   
To conclude we present a concise list of the most 
significant findings of this study, which represented a 
selection of three popular VWEs which were assessed in 
the year 2010 by a hybrid software inspection process. 
 
• All three (100%) VWEs were highly susceptible 
to key logging methods, which is used in order to 
gain unauthorized access to user accounts. 
• Mail and direct trading methods were to be the 
most likely method for intruders to transfer stolen 
virtual property items. 
• Intrusion detection or lack thereof, is of critical 
risk to all three VWEs and is considered of 
extreme concern. 
• Concurrent logins are not permitted but still don’t 
prevent an account being compromised and 
virtual property stolen. Simply due to the fact, the 
current active user is disconnected upon a second 
successful login. This can potentially result in an 
ongoing loop of authentication between owner 
and potential thief. 
• When virtual property was actively being stolen, 
this was not detected nor blocked. 
• Stolen virtual property items were unable to be 
recovered in all scenarios tested – which is also 
of high concern. 
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